Japan Prime Realty Investment (3283): Tokyo Office J-REIT Guide for U.S. Dividend Investors in 2026

Tokyo skyline showing Grade-A office towers in the Central Five Wards — JPR's core portfolio geography — with vacancy rate and rent growth data overlaid, illustrating the tight supply-demand dynamic driving JPR's distribution outlook in 2026.

I’ve been watching JPR’s Japanese-language IR releases closely for the past several months, and what keeps pulling me back is how dramatically the English-language coverage undersells the asset-recycling story — the cap-rate spreads on those December 2025 dispositions tell a completely different tale than the bland press-release summaries that make it onto Bloomberg.

Investment Thesis

Author’s View: Constructive | Fair-Value Estimate (Author’s Model): ¥102,000 | Last updated: May 2026

  • Tokyo Grade-A Central Five Wards vacancy hit 0.5% in Q1 2026, with rents up 18.2% YoY — JPR’s geographic concentration and active asset-recycling program position it to capture above-market DPU growth through 2027.
  • Yield 4.47% at ¥95,300 (May 21, 2026); forecasted DPU ¥2,139 (Jun-2026) and ¥2,120 (Dec-2026); 3.2% average annual earnings growth vs. –4.4% for the office REIT peer group; net profit margin 48.1%.
  • Top risk: BOJ rate hikes could widen J-REIT yield spreads and pressure unit prices; floating-rate debt exposure warrants monitoring against the distribution growth trajectory.

Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation (TSE: 8955) is one of Japan’s earliest listed office J-REITs and, in my view, one of the most misunderstood by international investors. The English-language coverage tends to treat it as a plain-vanilla Tokyo office play. The reality — visible only if you read the Japanese-language IR filings — is a disciplined portfolio recycler that has consistently outperformed its peer group by replacing aging assets with higher-growth mixed-use properties.

This guide covers everything a U.S.-based dividend investor needs: the macro backdrop, JPR’s structure and strategy, a valuation deep-dive with peer comparisons, practical buying mechanics, and a frank bear case. Sources are linked throughout, with Japanese-language primary documents called out explicitly so you can verify the edge yourself.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. I may or may not hold positions in 8955. See full Disclaimer at the end of this article.

MetricValue
TSE Ticker8955 (Japan Prime Realty Investment)
Unit Price (JPY)¥95,300 (May 21, 2026)
Market Cap¥385.8 billion
Dividend Yield4.47%
Forecasted DPU (Jun-2026)¥2,139
Forecasted DPU (Dec-2026)¥2,120
Net Profit Margin48.1%
Avg. Annual Earnings Growth3.2% (vs. –4.4% peer group)
1-Year Price Change+6.2% (as of May 20, 2026)
Portfolio Mix~80% office / ~20% urban retail

Why Tokyo’s Office Market Is Tighter Than Most Western Investors Realize

Most U.S. investors extrapolate from San Francisco or Manhattan when they think “office REIT” — and that instinct is exactly wrong for Tokyo in 2026. The post-pandemic remote-work correction that gutted U.S. CBD office markets never fully landed in Japan, where corporate culture, commute infrastructure, and management norms kept office attendance structurally higher.

Central Five Wards Vacancy Collapse: The Supply-Demand Math

According to Savills Japan’s Q1 2026 Tokyo Office Leasing Report, Grade-A vacancy in Tokyo’s Central Five Wards (Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, Shinjuku, Shibuya) stood at just 0.5% — effectively full occupancy. Grade-A rents strengthened 8.6% quarter-on-quarter and 18.2% year-on-year in the same period.

The supply side reinforces this tightness. New office completions scheduled for 2026–2028 are projected below the historical annual average, meaning the current landlord-favorable environment has structural legs — not just a cyclical bounce.

What the English summary of the Savills report does not reproduce is the ward-level vacancy sub-data published in the Japanese-language version (サヴィルズ東京オフィスレポート). Chiyoda and Minato — where JPR holds its heaviest concentration — show vacancy rates below even the already-tight 0.5% aggregate. That granularity matters for underwriting rent-renewal assumptions.

Inflation-Linked Leases: Tokyo’s Emerging Rent Escalator

A development largely absent from English-language coverage: Tokyo landlords began experimenting with CPI-linked lease clauses from 2026 onward. Traditionally, Japanese office leases reset at fixed intervals with landlord-tenant negotiation. The shift toward inflation escalators — even in early, experimental form — would be structurally transformative for J-REIT DPU compounding if it becomes standard practice.

The CBRE Japan Market Outlook 2026 flags this as a key watch item. The Japanese-language edition of the same report contains floor-by-floor absorption data for the Marunouchi/Otemachi sub-market — data that does not appear in the English summary and that directly informs rent-escalation modeling for JPR’s core buildings.

Urban Retail Tailwind: Inbound Tourism as a Secondary Catalyst

JPR’s portfolio is approximately 80% office and 20% urban retail. That retail slice is currently benefiting from Japan’s inbound tourism surge, which has pushed foot traffic and tenant sales in central Tokyo retail corridors to record levels. Rising wages among Japanese consumers are adding a domestic demand layer on top of the tourist tailwind.

For a U.S. investor accustomed to thinking of retail real estate as structurally challenged, JPR’s urban retail exposure is worth reframing: these are not suburban malls. They are street-level and podium retail in Tokyo’s densest pedestrian corridors — closer in character to Manhattan’s Fifth Avenue retail than to a U.S. power center.

Japan Prime Realty Investment (8955) — Structure, Sponsor, and Portfolio Snapshot

Before diving into valuation, a structural note for readers who may have encountered the ticker “3283” in reference to this company. Ticker 3283 on the TSE belongs to Nippon Prologis REIT, a logistics-focused vehicle. Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation trades under TSE: 8955. The confusion appears in some aggregator databases; this article uses 8955 throughout.

JPR listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in May 2002, making it one of Japan’s earliest office J-REITs — it has navigated the 2008 financial crisis, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the COVID-19 period, and the current BOJ policy normalization cycle. That track record across stress scenarios is itself a data point for dividend investors.

External Management Structure — Costs, Conflicts, and Why the Sponsor Relationship Matters

JPR is externally managed by Tokyo Tatemono Real Estate Investment Management Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Tokyo Tatemono Co., Ltd. — one of Japan’s oldest and most respected real estate developers, founded in 1896.

External management is standard for J-REITs, and the sponsor relationship is the key variable that differentiates good externally managed vehicles from mediocre ones. Tokyo Tatemono provides JPR with a right-of-first-look on new development completions, giving the REIT a proprietary deal pipeline that independent managers lack.

Tokyo Tatemono’s Japanese-language annual report (東京建物 統合報告書) discloses the sponsor’s development pipeline and the specific right-of-first-look framework with JPR. This forward-looking deal flow indicator is not summarized in any English-language REIT research note I have reviewed — it is the single most important document for modeling JPR’s five-year acquisition capacity.

The flip side of sponsor relationships is conflict of interest: the manager’s fee is typically asset-value-based, creating an incentive to grow AUM even when acquisitions are marginally dilutive. Domestic Japanese analyst reports from Nomura Securities and SMBC Nikko have flagged this as a nuance to watch during aggressive acquisition cycles — a concern I revisit in the Risks section.

Geographic Concentration: Central Tokyo as Both Strength and Concentration Risk

JPR’s portfolio is concentrated in the Central Five Wards of Tokyo, with the remainder in other Tokyo wards and limited exposure outside the capital. As of the 48th fiscal period (July–December 2025), operating revenue reached ¥20,346 million and net income ¥9,446 million, implying a net profit margin of 48.1% — strong for an externally managed vehicle. You can verify these figures directly on JPR’s official English IR page.

The 49th period forecast (January–June 2026) projects revenue of ¥20,746 million and net income of ¥9,573 million — a modest sequential improvement. Market cap stood at approximately ¥385.8 billion as of May 21, 2026, per data aggregated on JAPAN-REIT.COM’s 8955 data page.

Asset Recycling as a Distribution Engine — JPR’s Buy-High, Sell-Higher Playbook

This is where JPR diverges most sharply from its passive office REIT peers, and where the Japanese-language source advantage is most pronounced. The English IR summary page describes acquisitions and dispositions in broad strokes. The Japanese-language 取得及び譲渡に関するお知らせ (acquisition and disposition notices) published on jpr-reit.co.jp/ja/ contain cap-rate and NOI detail for each individual transaction.

Those numbers allow a precise calculation of the recycling spread — the difference between the cap rate at which JPR acquires assets and the cap rate at which it disposes of legacy assets. A positive spread (selling at compressed cap rates, buying at higher initial yields) is accretive to long-run DPU. No English-language source I have reviewed has published this calculation for JPR’s recent transactions.

The Grand Front Osaka Move — Diversification or Distraction?

In December 2025, JPR acquired four properties totaling ¥31.91 billion. The headline transaction was additional stakes in Grand Front Osaka — a landmark mixed-use complex combining retail, office, and hotel components in Osaka’s Umeda district. JPR also acquired a standalone retail property and a hotel in the same tranche.

The Osaka move raised eyebrows among some domestic analysts who view JPR as a pure Tokyo play. My read: Grand Front Osaka is one of Japan’s highest-quality mixed-use assets, with institutional-grade tenants and strong foot traffic from both domestic and inbound visitors. It is not geographic diversification for its own sake — it is upgrading the portfolio’s growth profile. The estie report on the December 2025 transaction provides the English-language summary; the Japanese-language notice contains the full NOI breakdown.

Simultaneously, JPR disposed of two older office assets for ¥9.53 billion at substantial premiums to appraisal value. This is the recycling engine in action: monetize legacy assets at peak valuations, redeploy into higher-growth properties. The net acquisition outlay was approximately ¥22.4 billion — funded through a combination of debt and retained proceeds.

Unit Buybacks in a J-REIT Context — Why This Is Unusual and Bullish

Between February and June 2025, JPR repurchased 11,364 investment units for ¥3.99 billion and subsequently canceled them. Unit buybacks are rare in the J-REIT universe — the structural imperative to distribute income leaves limited retained cash for capital return programs.

When a J-REIT executes a buyback, it signals two things: management believes the unit price is below intrinsic value, and the balance sheet has sufficient flexibility to absorb the outlay without compromising distribution capacity. Both signals are constructive for long-term unitholders. The buyback is accretive to per-unit DPU because the same distributable income is now divided across fewer units.

For context on how this fits the broader J-REIT governance environment, see Japan REITs 2026: Best Picks for Dividend Yield (4–6%), which covers the TSE capital-efficiency pressure driving buyback activity across the sector.

Reading the 50th Period Revenue Dip — Transition Noise vs. Structural Signal

The 50th fiscal period forecast (July–December 2026) shows revenue declining to ¥19,382 million from ¥20,746 million in the 49th period — a roughly 6.5% sequential drop. Net income is forecasted at ¥7,962 million versus ¥9,573 million. This number will appear alarming in a screener without context.

The decline reflects a known transition effect: assets disposed in the December 2025 recycling cycle are no longer generating revenue, while newly acquired assets ramp up occupancy and NOI. This is a timing mismatch inherent to active portfolio management, not a structural deterioration. The DPU forecast for December 2026 of ¥2,120 — only marginally below the June 2026 forecast of ¥2,139 — confirms that distributable income is holding up even as accounting revenue dips. Monitor the 49th period actual results (expected around August 2026) against the forecast as the key validation checkpoint.

Valuation Deep-Dive — Yield, NAV Discount, and Peer Comparison

At ¥95,300 per unit with a forecasted DPU of ¥2,139 for the June 2026 period, JPR offers a trailing/forward yield of approximately 4.47%. For a U.S. dividend investor accustomed to comparing against the 10-year Treasury, that spread is meaningful — and it comes with the additional potential of yen appreciation as BOJ policy normalizes.

NAV Discount Math — Estimating Fair Value for a U.S. Investor

J-REITs broadly traded at approximately a 20% discount to NAV based on appraisal values in late 2025, according to analysis from SuMi TRUST Asset Management’s J-REIT market commentary. If JPR’s discount compresses toward the historical 10% level — driven by activist investor pressure and improving fundamentals — the implied unit price would approach ¥102,000 to ¥105,000, consistent with my fair-value estimate.

The NAV discount compression thesis is not guaranteed, but it has a clear catalyst mechanism: activist funds have been accumulating J-REIT units precisely because the discount creates an exploitable gap between market price and appraisal value. The JPX J-REIT issues list provides the full universe for context on how JPR’s discount compares to peers.

Yield Spread vs. JGB 10-Year — The Rate-Sensitivity Equation

The yield spread between JPR’s distribution yield and the JGB 10-year is the primary valuation anchor for domestic institutional investors. As BOJ rate normalization pushes JGB yields higher, this spread compresses — and J-REIT unit prices adjust downward to restore an equilibrium spread.

The partial offset is that rising rates in Japan reflect an improving nominal growth environment, which supports rent escalation. For large, high-quality J-REITs like JPR, increased rental income has historically more than offset higher borrowing costs — but the timing lag between rate increases and rent renewals creates a window of unit price pressure even when the fundamental thesis remains intact.

I track the JGB 10-year vs. JPR yield spread on TradingView’s chart view alongside JPR’s unit price — the visual correlation makes the rate sensitivity immediately legible. When the spread narrows below 200 basis points, history suggests caution on near-term entry timing.

How JPR Stacks Up Against NBF and JRE on Key Metrics

MetricJPR (8955)NBF (8951)JRE (8952)
Dividend Yield (approx.)4.47%~3.5%~3.8%
Portfolio FocusOffice + Urban RetailPure OfficeDiversified Office
Avg. Annual Earnings Growth+3.2%Peer avg. –4.4%Peer avg. –4.4%
Unit Buyback ActivityYes (2025)LimitedLimited
Sponsor Pipeline QualityTokyo Tatemono (strong)Mitsui Fudosan (strong)Mitsubishi Estate (strong)
Geographic FocusCentral Tokyo + OsakaCentral TokyoCentral Tokyo + regional

JPR’s yield premium over NBF and JRE reflects both the mixed-use exposure (perceived as slightly lower quality than pure Grade-A office) and the active recycling strategy (which introduces short-term revenue volatility). In my view, the yield premium overcompensates for these factors given JPR’s demonstrated earnings growth outperformance.

For a detailed breakdown of NBF’s pure-play office thesis, see How U.S. Investors Can Capture NBF (8951) at 3.52% Yield. For the JRE comparison, Japan Real Estate Investment (8952): The 2026 Hub Analysis for REITs covers the diversified office angle in depth.

From a U.S. portfolio perspective, JPR occupies a niche similar to a blended REIT ETF position — not quite the pure-play office concentration of NBF, but more growth-oriented than a bond-like utility REIT. For an IRA-suitable allocation, I would frame it as a 2–4% position within a diversified dividend sleeve, sized to reflect JPY currency exposure.

Practical Mechanics for U.S. Investors — Buying, Taxes, and Currency

JPR trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange under ticker 8955. There is no U.S.-listed ADR program. Accessing the stock requires a broker with direct TSE market access — the most common options for U.S.-based investors are Interactive Brokers (IBKR) and Fidelity International.

Brokerage Access and Settlement

At ¥95,300 per unit and a minimum lot size of one unit, the entry cost is approximately $620 at a 153 JPY/USD exchange rate — an accessible lot size for most retail investors. Settlement follows the Japanese T+2 cycle. IBKR handles JPY conversion automatically at competitive spreads; Fidelity International requires a funded JPY sub-account in most configurations.

One practical note: JPR distributes semi-annually (June and December fiscal periods), not monthly like many U.S. REITs. U.S. investors accustomed to monthly income should model cash flow accordingly. TradingView’s screener makes it easy to filter TSE REITs by yield and distribution frequency if you want to compare JPR against monthly-paying alternatives.

Withholding Tax and the Foreign Tax Credit — Don’t Leave Money on the Table

Japanese dividend withholding for foreign investors is typically 20.315%. However, under the U.S.-Japan tax treaty, this is reduced to 15% for U.S. residents. The withheld 15% is claimable as a foreign tax credit on IRS Form 1116 — effectively making the net tax cost zero for investors in a taxable brokerage account with sufficient U.S. tax liability to absorb the credit.

For IRA holders: foreign tax credits cannot be claimed inside a tax-deferred account. The 15% withholding becomes a permanent drag on yield inside an IRA. For this reason, JPR (and J-REITs generally) are better suited to taxable brokerage accounts where the treaty-rate credit is fully claimable. This is a meaningful structural consideration that most English-language J-REIT coverage omits entirely.

Currency risk is the other key variable. The yen has been broadly weak against the USD over the past several years, creating a headwind for USD-denominated total return. However, BOJ rate normalization — gradual as it is — provides a structural tailwind for yen appreciation over the medium term. A strengthening yen amplifies JPR’s USD total return on top of the 4.47% distribution yield. Position sizing should reflect this two-sided currency exposure.

Risks and Counter-View — Three Reasons the Bull Case Could Stall

A constructive view on JPR requires engaging seriously with the bear case. Here are the three risks I consider most material, grounded in data rather than boilerplate.

Risk 1 — BOJ Rate Hike Trajectory: Stress-Testing Distribution Coverage

The Bank of Japan exited negative interest rate policy in March 2024 and has signaled further gradual normalization. Each 25-basis-point hike in the policy rate pushes JGB yields higher, compressing the spread between J-REIT distribution yields and risk-free rates — and mechanically pressuring unit prices even when underlying NOI is growing.

JPR’s floating-rate debt exposure is the critical variable here. The exact floating-rate ratio is not disclosed in the English IR summary; it appears in the Japanese-language 有価証券報告書 (securities report) filed on EDINET. Investors with EDINET access should pull the most recent filing and calculate the floating-rate share of total debt before sizing a position. A ratio above 30% floating in a rising-rate environment would be a meaningful drag on distributable income.

Risk 2 — NISA Reform and the Retail Investor Exodus from J-REITs

The 2024 NISA reform excluded monthly-distribution mutual funds from the growth investment bucket (成長投資枠). These funds were among the largest retail buyers of J-REIT units in Japan. The exclusion has reduced a key source of domestic demand, creating a structural headwind for J-REIT unit prices even as fundamentals improve.

This is not a near-term catastrophe — institutional and foreign investor demand has partially offset the retail outflow — but it is a persistent supply-demand headwind that suppresses the multiple at which J-REITs trade relative to NAV. The discount-to-NAV compression thesis depends partly on this headwind abating or being overwhelmed by activist and institutional buying.

Risk 3 — 50th Period Revenue Decline and Execution Risk on Asset Recycling

The 50th period (July–December 2026) revenue forecast of ¥19,382 million represents a ~6.5% sequential decline from the 49th period. I characterized this above as transition noise — and I believe that framing is correct. But execution risk is real: if the Grand Front Osaka retail and hotel assets face occupancy pressure, or if new acquisitions underperform their underwritten NOI, the recycling premium that justifies the strategy evaporates.

The 49th period actual results (expected around August 2026) are the near-term validation checkpoint. If actual revenue and NOI come in at or above the ¥20,746 million / ¥9,573 million forecast, the 50th period dip is confirmed as transitional. A miss on the 49th period would require reassessment of the recycling thesis.

Additionally, domestic analyst reports from Nomura Securities and SMBC Nikko have flagged the management fee structure under Tokyo Tatemono as a potential misalignment of incentives during aggressive acquisition cycles — the asset-value-based fee creates an incentive to grow AUM even when acquisitions are marginally dilutive to per-unit DPU. This nuance is absent from English-language coverage and warrants ongoing monitoring.

Bottom Line — Author’s View on JPR (8955) for 2026

JPR is not a simple “buy Tokyo offices and collect rent” story. It is an active portfolio recycler with a 24-year track record, a high-quality sponsor pipeline, and a demonstrated ability to grow earnings in an environment where the peer group is shrinking. The 4.47% yield at current prices compensates adequately for the BOJ rate risk and currency exposure, in my assessment.

My fair-value estimate of ¥102,000 rests on three converging drivers: NAV discount compression from approximately 20% toward the historical 10% level as activist pressure builds; DPU stability at ¥2,120–¥2,139 supporting a 4.4%+ yield floor; and Tokyo Grade-A rent escalation feeding into lease renewals through 2026–2027. The 50th period revenue dip is a known, time-limited effect — not a reason to exit the position.

For a dividend-focused U.S. investor comfortable with JPY exposure, I would frame JPR as a core 2–4% position within a Japan allocation, held in a taxable brokerage account to capture the U.S.-Japan treaty withholding credit. Monitor three metrics on a quarterly basis: (1) Tokyo Central Five Wards vacancy rate from Savills or CBRE Japan, (2) JPR’s 49th and 50th period actual vs. forecast revenue, and (3) the JGB 10-year yield vs. JPR distribution yield spread.

The JPR story is most legible in Japanese — and that information asymmetry is precisely what creates the opportunity for investors willing to go one layer deeper than the English IR page.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What is the current dividend yield for Japan Prime Realty Investment (8955)?

As of May 21, 2026, JPR’s distribution yield is approximately 4.47% based on a unit price of ¥95,300 and a forecasted DPU of ¥2,139 for the June 2026 period. Distributions are paid semi-annually (June and December), not monthly. The December 2026 DPU is forecasted at ¥2,120 — a marginal decline reflecting the asset-transition period following the December 2025 recycling transactions.

Q: How does Japanese withholding tax work for U.S. investors holding JPR?

Japan withholds 20.315% on distributions to foreign investors by default. Under the U.S.-Japan tax treaty, U.S. residents qualify for a reduced 15% withholding rate. That 15% can be claimed as a foreign tax credit on IRS Form 1116 in a taxable brokerage account, effectively offsetting the withholding against your U.S. tax liability. Inside an IRA, the foreign tax credit cannot be claimed — making taxable accounts the preferred vehicle for JPR and J-REITs generally.

Q: Can I buy JPR (8955) through Interactive Brokers or Fidelity?

Yes. Interactive Brokers (IBKR) provides direct TSE access with competitive JPY/USD conversion spreads and is the most commonly used platform among U.S. retail investors for Japanese equities. Fidelity International also provides TSE access but may require a funded JPY sub-account. There is no U.S.-listed ADR for JPR, so direct TSE purchase is the only route. Minimum investment is one unit at approximately ¥95,300 (~$620 at 153 JPY/USD).

Q: What is the biggest risk to JPR’s distribution in 2026–2027?

The most material near-term risk is the BOJ rate hike trajectory. Rising JGB yields compress J-REIT yield spreads and can pressure unit prices independent of underlying NOI performance. JPR’s floating-rate debt exposure — disclosed in the Japanese-language 有価証券報告書 on EDINET but not in the English IR summary — is the key variable to monitor. A secondary risk is execution on the asset-recycling program: if the Grand Front Osaka assets underperform their underwritten NOI, the recycling premium thesis weakens.

Q: Why does JPR show a revenue decline in the 50th fiscal period forecast?

The 50th period (July–December 2026) revenue forecast of ¥19,382 million is lower than the 49th period forecast of ¥20,746 million because assets disposed in the December 2025 recycling transactions are no longer generating revenue, while newly acquired assets are still ramping up occupancy and NOI. This is a timing mismatch inherent to active portfolio management. The DPU forecast of ¥2,120 for December 2026 — only marginally below the June 2026 forecast — confirms that distributable income is holding up. The 49th period actual results (expected August 2026) are the key validation checkpoint.

How to Buy JPR (8955) as an International Investor

Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange under ticker 8955. There is no sponsored ADR program internationally — direct TSE purchase is the only route to ownership.

International investors can access 8955 directly through:

  • Saxo Bank — full TSE coverage, available in Singapore, Japan, Europe, and most countries. Strong platform for Japan equity access. Preferred broker for our Singapore/Asia-based readers.
  • Interactive Brokers (IBKR) — direct TSE access, competitive JPY/USD spread, available in the U.S. and most countries. Strong choice for U.S.-based investors. Handles JPY conversion automatically.
  • Webull — lower minimums, growing TSE coverage, good for smaller position sizes (U.S. audience). Verify current JPR availability directly with Webull before opening a position.

Tax notes by country:

  • Singapore: No capital gains tax on Japan stocks. Japanese dividends are subject to 20.315% withholding (15% when the Japan-Singapore tax treaty applies via your broker). Check with your broker on treaty reclaim procedures.
  • United States: Japanese dividend withholding is 15% under the U.S.-Japan tax treaty; claimable as a foreign tax credit on IRS Form 1116. Best held in a taxable brokerage account — the credit cannot be used inside an IRA or 401(k).
  • Other countries: Withholding rates vary by treaty. Check Japan’s National Tax Agency treaty list or consult your broker for the applicable rate and reclaim procedure.

Account opening eligibility varies by country of residence. I am not affiliated with these brokers; this is general information only. Always verify current terms directly with the broker.

Disclaimer: This article is intended for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any security. Opinions expressed are my own and do not represent the views of any financial institution. I may or may not hold positions in Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation (8955) as of May 2026. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing in foreign securities involves currency risk, political risk, and other risks not present in domestic investments. U.S. investors should consult a qualified tax advisor regarding the foreign tax credit treatment of J-REIT distributions. This disclosure is made in accordance with FTC 16 CFR Part 255 regarding endorsements and testimonials. See full Disclaimer for complete terms.

Follow @bestjapanstocks